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Water Markets and the Cost of Improving Water Quality in 
the San Francisco Bay/Delta Estuary 
David Sunding, David Zilbermann, and Neal MacDougall* 
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing awareness of the economic dislocation caused by 
policies to stabilize and improve water quality. A notable and timely 
example of such regulation is the restoration of anadromous fisheries and 
the protection of endangered species by enhancing fresh water flows into 
the San Francisco Bay/Delta estuary, which will ultimately be accomplished 
by reducing surface water diversions to California farmers. This Article 
presents a method for measuring the short-term economic impacts of 
reducing agricultural water supplies under different water trading scenarios 
and applies the method to the problem of Bay/Delta water quality 
regulation. The economic analysis shows that water trading within 
agriculture can dramatically reduce the economic impacts of improving 
Bay/Delta water quality. 
II. WATER QUALITY REGULATIONS IN THE SAN FRANCISCO
BAY/DELTA ESTUARY
The San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta estuary 
(hereinafter "Bay/Delta") is the largest and most productive estuary on the 
Pacific Coast. Its watershed drains 40 percent of California's land area, 
supports over 120 fish species, and includes the largest brackish marsh in 
the western United States. In the last two decades, however, the fish and 
wildlife resources in the Bay/Delta watershed have declined to record low 
levels.1 Biologists believe that most of the decline has been caused by 
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increased exports of water from the Delta to cities and farms.2 As evidence of 
this decline, two aquatic species are currently listed under the Endangered 
Species Act (hereinafter "ESA")—winter run salmon and delta smelt—and 
two other species are candidate for protection. 
Two federal environmental agencies have statutory responsibilities to 
protect the Bay/Delta watershed: the Environmental Protection Agency 
under the Clean Water Act,3 and the Department of the Interior under the 
ESA, the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, and the recently enacted 
Central Valley Project Improvement Act (hereinafter "CVPIA").4 All of these 
laws, either directly or indirectly, will result in an increased quantity of water 
allocated to the estuary to improve water quality. 
This Article assesses the economic impacts of reducing surface water 
diversions to improve water quality in the Bay/Delta estuary. Since 
agriculture uses 80 percent of the state's water supply and urban demands 
are increasing, the water needed to meet federal water quality requirements 
is likely to be reallocated from agricultural users. A key finding of this Article 
is that the impacts of water quality requirements depend to a large extent 
on how the burden for meeting the requirements is allocated among 
existing users. How cuts are spread among users is as important as how much 
water is taken for the environment. 
Water trading can reduce the adverse impacts of environmental quality 
regulations if there are multiple users whose supplies can be cut and if there 
is a disparity in the productivity of water used in agriculture. This Article 
begins with an overview of agricultural water use in California, and 
demonstrates the large disparity in agricultural water productivity. We 
demonstrate that the least productive 50% of water used by the State's 
growers produces only 15% of total farm sales. There is thus ample reason to 
believe that water trading can significantly reduce the economic impact of 
participants in seminars at UC Santa Barbara, the Water Resource Association, and 
the University of California Conference on Regional Water Constraints. 
1. J. Callahan et al., The San Francisco Bay/Delta Striped Bass Fishery: Anatomy of a
Decline (1989) (Working Paper No. 499, California Agricultural Experiment Station, 
Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics). 
2. P. Moyle & R. Yoshiyama, Fishes, Aquatic Diversity Management Areas, and
Endangered Species: A plan to Protect California’s Native Aquatic Biota, California Policy 
Seminar, University of California at Berkeley, (1992); P. Williams, Discussion of Trends in 
Freshwater Inflow to San Francisco Bay from the Sacrament-San Joaquin Delta, 27 WATER 
RESOURCES BULLETIN, Apr. 1991, at 325; M. Rozengurt et al., The Role of Water Diversions in 
the Decline of Fisheries of the Delta-San Francisco Bay and Other Estuaries (1987) (Technical 
Report No. 87-8, Tiburon Center for Environmental Studies, San Francisco State 
University). 
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1994).
4. Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4706 (1992).
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reallocating water from agriculture by ensuring that only the least productive 
growers cease production. 
The Article next introduces a short-run impact model for measuring 
the reduction in economic activity caused by a cut in surface water supplies 
to California agriculture. The model is based on the notion of asset fixity and 
envisions that growers will respond to changes in water supply conditions 
by altering their land allocation. This observation is supported by the 
behavior of California growers during the recent, severe drought of 1987-
1992.5
The impact model is used to measure the change in State farm sales in 
several different water supply reduction scenarios. First, the model was run 
for cuts in surface water supplies of up to 2.5 million acre feet (hereinafter 
"MAF") annually, focusing on reductions between 0.8 and 1.3 MAF. Second, 
the model was run under two water trading environments: one in which CVP 
contractors receive proportional cuts in their supplies and cannot trade, and 
a scenario in which contractors can trade among themselves to make up for 
lost supplies or sell their remaining supplies. The central conclusion of this 
Article is that allowing water trading among growers can dramatically reduce 
the adverse economic impacts of improving Bay/Delta water quality. By 
maintaining an economically healthy agricultural sector while improving 
habitat in the important Bay/Delta estuary, water trading can help ensure 
the coexistence of agriculture and the natural environment. 
III. CURRENT WATER APPLICATION PATTERNS
Water availability, amongst other reasons, has enabled California to 
become the largest agricultural producer in the nation, accounting for 
eleven percent of production by volume and thirteen percent by value. Value 
is proportionately larger than volume since California growers produce large 
amounts of high-value specialty crops and fresh produce. The soil in 
California is particularly well suited to high-value crops, and the warm 
climate enables longer growing seasons. The availability of irrigation water 
is necessary to fully utilize California's rich soil and advantageous growing 
environment. This becomes apparent in view of the fact that only two 
percent of total crop acreage in the grain belt—Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, 
Nebraska, and Missouri—is irrigated compared to twenty-six percent of 
agricultural land in California. 
Despite the relative scarcity of water in California, growers in the state 
continue to produce a number of crops that have a relatively low value per 
unit of water applied. Field crops such as rice and alfalfa require relatively 
large amounts of water, while higher-value crops such as lettuce, tomatoes, 
5. D. ZILBERMANN ET AL., HOW CALIFORNIA RESPONDED TO THE DROUGHT (1992).
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grapes, citrus, broccoli and carrots have irrigation depth requirements 
ranging from one to over four acre feet per acre. 
It is important to quantify the disparity between the water 
requirements of the various crops and their relative contribution to 
agricultural value. Figure 1 shows all crops in ascending order based on 
value per acre foot of water used in their production. The horizontal axis 
shows cumulative contribution to total agricultural water use and the 
vertical axis gives total contribution to total annual State agricultural value.6 
If water were equally productive in all crops and regions, then the use-value 
relationship depicted in Figure 1 would be the 45 degree line. For example, 
50% of the water used by farmers would produce 50% of crop sales. Figure 1 
6. Irrigation depth data: A. Dinar et al., Modeling Regional Irrigation Decisions and
Drainage Pollution Control, in NATURAL RESOURCE MODELING 191-212 (1991); STATE OF
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, BULLETIN 160-93: CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN 
UPDATE (1993). Crop value data: D. ZILBERMANN ET AL., ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF WATER
QUALITY REGULATION IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY/DELTA ESTUARY (1992). 
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suggests, however, that a number of crops in California use copious 
amounts of water while contributing relatively little to the State's economy. 
Indeed, Figure 1 shows that the least productive 50% of the water used in 
California agriculture produces just fifteen percent of annual farm revenues. 
This disparity in agricultural water productivity across crops and 
regions implies that policy makers should use discretion in implementing 
policies that reallocate water from agriculture to the environment. If water is 
taken from high-value uses with no possibility of private exchange to replace 
lost supplies, then the cost of improving water quality may be needlessly 
large. We now turn to a description of an economic impact model of 
California water policy that measures the economic loss from Bay/Delta 
water quality standards in different trading environments. 
IV. IMPACT MODEL
A. Modeling Agricultural Production and Water Use
This section describes a method for measuring the short-term 
economic impacts of water policy changes known as the "rationing" model. 
The discussion in this Article is mostly informal.7 The model's name derives 
from its central feature: growers respond to changes in water allocations by 
fallowing land otherwise devoted to production of the lowest-value crops. 
This approach reflects the fact that growers have a large degree of flexibility 
when they make long-term decisions regarding irrigation technology and 
cropping patterns, but have only limited flexibility in the short-run. 
The rationing analysis is motivated by the large degree of 
heterogeneity in California agriculture demonstrated earlier. The Central 
Valley consists of many production environments that vary in terms of 
weather, land quality, water availability, and marketing conditions. Existing 
crop allocation patterns have evolved over time to maximize the overall 
benefits from agricultural production. At each location, farmers have 
invested substantial resources in infrastructure, including equipment for 
harvesting, packing, and irrigation systems. As a result, crop mix choices are 
predetermined in the short-run and are appropriate for individual locations. 
Reductions in water supply that change the preconditions for a successful 
crop mix are likely to be met with the only response available to growers—
they will cease production of certain crops by allocating the requisite water 
to other uses. 
7. See D. SUNDING ET AL., THE COSTS OF REALLOCATED WATER FROM AGRICULTURE 
(1994). 
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In this respect, the rationing model is an example of the "putty-clay" 
approach to production economics pioneered by Houthakker and Johansen.8 
The approach has been refined and applied to agricultural settings by 
Hochman and Zilberman.9 Putty-clay models treat consumption decisions as 
predetermined in the short-run by previous consumption technology 
choices. For example, the water consumption of urban households is 
determined by the type of toilet and shower head used, the type of 
landscaping installed, and other factors that are generally variable only in 
the long-run. The notion that irrigation technology choice is conditioned by 
soil quality and availability of groundwater has been well established.10 
Another factor motivating the rationing approach is that there is 
evidence that there is a proportional relationship between applied water and 
crop output per acre within a given irrigation technology, at least below a 
certain level of applied water (the "crop water requirement"). Water 
application above the water requirement yields no additional output.11 This 
finding implies that farmers' short-run response to cuts in their surface 
water supplies is to either irrigate a field wit the quantity of water required 
for maximum yield or not irrigate it at all. 
One additional response available to growers that may be 
implemented even in the short-run is to increase groundwater pumping. The 
rationing model is, however, built on the assumption that growers keep their 
level of groundwater pumping fixed. Two basic facts underlie this 
assumption. First, growers may have pumping constraints determined by 
existing well capacity that prohibit large increases in pumping volume in the 
short term. This capacity constraint exists most notably in the southern and 
western San Joaquin Valley where the majority of groundwater pumping 
occurs. Second, allowing growers to substitute groundwater for surface 
water artificially reduces economic impacts in the short run. There are, of 
course, potentially large long-run economic costs resulting from 
8. H. Houthakker, The Pareto Distribution and the Cobb-Douglas Production Function in
Activity Analysis, in REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 27-31 (1956); L. JOHANSEN, PRODUCTION 
FUNCTIONS: AN INTEGRATION OF MICRO AND MACRO. SHORT-RUN AND LONG-RUN ASPECTS 
(1972). 
9. E. Hochman, & D. Zilbermann, Examination of Environmental Polices Using
Production and Pollution Microparameter Distributions, in ECONOMETRICA (1978). 
10. M. Casewell & D. Zilbermann, The Effects of Well Depth and Land Quality on the
Choice or Irrigation Technology, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS (1986); M. 
Casewell & D. Zilbermann, The Choices of Irrigation Technologies in California, 67(2) 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 224-234 (1985). 
11. J. Letey et al., A Crop-Water Production Function Model for Saline Irrigation Waters,
in SOIL SCIENCE OF AMERICAN JOURNAL 1005-1009 (1985); J. Letey & A. Dinar, Simulated 
Crop-Water Production Functions for Several Crops when Irrigated with Saline Waters, in 
HILGARDIA 1-31 (1986). 
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groundwater overdraft, including increasing pumping costs and possible 
subsidence. Numerous economic studies have shown that groundwater 
mining essentially trades current gains for future losses. Average profits over 
the long-run with and without groundwater mining are nearly equal.12 The 
rationing model, as configured for this study, constrains growers increasing 
their rate of groundwater withdrawal. 
In summary, the rationing model has a number of desirable properties. 
The rationing approach accurately captures growers' short-run response to 
changes in water supply policy by emphasizing land allocation. The model is 
also consistent with the best scientific information on the crop-water 
relationship. Perhaps most important, the rationing model can be explained 
easily to policymaker not formally trained in economics. 
B. Modeling Water Trading and Reallocation Scenarios
The rationing model can be configured to consider various trading and 
reallocation scenarios. The basic unit of analysis is comprised of 86 
individual water districts receiving water from the Central Valley Project 
(hereinafter "CVP"), and the model considers production of 34 crops 
including vegetables, field crops, and perennials. The rationing model is 
thus one of the most detailed representations of California water policy 
impacts. 
The numerous individual water districts are grouped into five 
contiguous regions with similar growing conditions: Delta-Mendota Canal, 
Friant-Kern Canal, San Joaquin and Mendota Pool, San Luis/Cross Valley 
Canal and Tehama-Colusa. In reality and in the model, water is traded within 
each of the five regions. Water is thus allocated efficiently within each of 
these regions but not necessarily among regions. 
California's water conveyance system is imperfect, resulting in serious 
physical constraints to interregional trading. For example, it is difficult for a 
grower on the Friant-Kern system to trade his CVP allotment with a grower 
on the Delta-Mendota Canal since the water would have to be conveyed 
through the Delta. Further, pumping constraints at the Delta motivated by 
endangered species concerns may make it difficult for a grower in the 
Tehama-Colusa region of the Sacramento Valley to trade with a grower in 
the San Luis/Cross-Valley Canal region south of the Delta. 
The rationing model is employed to measure the costs of improving 
Bay/Delta water quality in two alternative water trading scenarios: proportional 
and efficient reallocations of water from CVP contractors to the environment. 
Proportional implementation occurs when supply reductions are allocated 
12. M. Gisser, Groundwater: Focusing on the Real Issue, in JOURNAL OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 1001-1027 (1983); O. Burt, The Economics of Conjunctive Use of Ground and Surface 
Water, in HILGARDIA 31-111 (1964). 
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proportionally to past use in each of the regions; again, water is allocated 
efficiently within each region. Efficient implementation allows trading 
among all five regions to determine the final allocation of the supply cuts. In 
this scenario a grower can resort to the market to make up for lost supplies 
or sell water to another grower if this is more profitable than producing a 
crop. 
Comparing the economic costs of these two policies measures the 
potential efficiency gain from market implementation of Bay/Delta water 
quality regulations. While it seems likely that the efficient scenario will have 
lower economic costs than proportional implementation, the magnitude of 
the welfare gain is very much an open question. 
C. Economic Impact Measures
The basic output of the rationing model is the change in regional 
agricultural sales, in dollars, resulting from shifts in water policy. There are 
solid theoretical arguments for using gross revenue as the economic impact 
measure versus grower profit. The change in grower profit is an appropriate 
measure of social value only when factors of production such as labor and 
machinery can be costlessly redeployed in other sectors of the economy.13 
While this assumption might arguably be realistic in some industries, it is 
certainly not true in agriculture. Agricultural machinery and other non-
human inputs such as chemicals are highly specialized. Farmworkers have 
an especially difficult time obtaining employment in sectors outside 
agriculture, especially in a state such as California where the vast majority of 
field workers are Hispanic and often have little job training or language 
skills. Using gross revenue as a welfare measure more accurately captures 
the value of the reduction in economic activity resulting from reduced 
diversions of surface water. 
The rationing model is also used to measure the total change in the 
value of economic activity in the State and the number of jobs lost as a 
result of improving Bay/Delta water quality. These figures are calculated 
using multipliers taken from an input-output model created to analyze water 
resource problems in California.14 
V. COSTS OF IMPROVING WATER QUALITY
The overall impacts of the two water reduction plans on revenue losses 
are summarized in Table 1 for two levels of aggregate supply reductions. 
13. R. JUST ET AL., APPLIED WELFARE ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1982).
14. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, BULLETIN 210: MEASURING 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS, THE APPLICATION OF INPUT-OUTPUT ANALYSIS TO CALIFORNIA WATER
RESOURCES PROBLEMS 23 (1980). 
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Losses under the efficient reallocation are consistently less than losses 
under the proportional reallocation, demonstrating that the economic costs 
of improving Bay/Delta water quality are reduced by water trading within 
state agriculture. Due to its high degree of disaggregation, the model also 
measures regional impacts from reducing surface water diversions. 
A. Aggregate Impacts
The CVPIA directs that 0.8 MAF of water be taken from agriculture in an 
average water year. The rationing model shows that the economic costs of 
this action to improve water quality are only $40 million annually with 
unrestricted water trading and nearly $100 million in the proportional 
implementation scenario. Nearly 2,000 jobs are lost under the efficient 
solution, and more than twice as many are lost under the proportional 
reduction. 
Table 1 also displays impacts when 1.3 MAF are reallocated in a 
normal year. Additional 0.5 MAF reduction beyond the initial 0.8 MAF level 
will result in an additional $60 million in lost farm revenue under the 
efficient solution and about $125 million under the proportional solution. 
The impact on labor will be around 2,400 lost jobs under the efficient 
solution, and about 5,400 lost jobs under the proportional solution. Thus, 
the economic costs of an additional 0.5 MAF incremental cut is larger than 
the costs of the initial 0.8 MAF reallocation mandated by the CVPIA. 
Table 1 also shows declines in State product as surface water 
diversions decline. The State product multipliers are crop-specific, so the 
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effect of a one-acre reduction in vegetables is greater than a similar 
reduction in field crops. Vegetables have greater linkages with the State 
economy as they require substantial resources for production, harvesting, 
processing and marketing, so eliminating an acre of vegetable production 
has more impact on the broader economy. 
B. Regional Impacts
The proportional and efficient implementation schemes have different 
regional impacts as well as different total impacts. These distributional 
effects aid in assessing community impacts outside the agricultural sector. 
The farm revenue loss functions are disaggregated among each of the five 
regions and are presented in Table 2. 
When water supply cuts are implemented as in the proportional 
scenario, the San Joaquin-Mendota Pool and the Friant-Kern regions are the 
most seriously impacted because so much land in the southern and western 
San Joaquin Valley is devoted to production of high-value crops. The value 
of agricultural production drops in these regions by a total of around $75 
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million dollars under the 0.8 MAF reduction, and by over $180 million 
annually under the 1.3 MAF reduction. Under the efficient reduction scheme, 
production patterns in the four San Joaquin Valley regions are relatively 
unaffected by the supply reductions, while the Tehama-Colusa region is the 
most affected due to its emphasis on rice and other field crops. Tehama-
Colusa farm sales fall by around $35 million annually under the 0.8 MAF cut 
and by over $50 million under the 1.3 MAF cut. 
Table 2 shows the change in the value of regional crop sales resulting 
from the agricultural water supply cut. The impact calculations for each 
region do not include proceeds from or expenditures on water transfers. 
Rather, the rationing model only measures the value of the reduction in 
economic activity since the transfer payments net out in aggregate. Table 2 
indicates where the water for Bay/Delta improvement will come from, and 
shows where agricultural production will be curtailed as a result. 
Third party impacts from improving Bay/Delta water quality will be 
largest in the southern and western portions of the San Joaquin Valley under 
proportional implementation of the supply cuts. Under efficient 
implementation, third party impacts will be largest in the Sacramento 
Valley. It is important to remember, however, that the total third part impacts 
of reducing agricultural water supplies are minimized under the efficient 
implmentation scheme allowing interregional trading.15 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The Bay/Delta estuary is at the core of California's water conveyance 
system, and managing water quality in this important resource is the central 
policy issue faced by those controlling water allocation in the State. The 
Bay/Delta is also at the confluence of two major movements in western 
water policy: increasing recognition of the environment as a legitimate 
demander of water and increasing acceptance of market mechanisms to 
allocate water. This Article demonstrates that these two forces are 
complementary in the sense that market implementation of water quality 
regulations can minimize their adverse economic impacts. 
To environmental economists, the notion that markets have the 
potential to ameliorate the impacts of environmental quality regulations is 
almost second nature. What is surprising in the case of California water, 
however, is the magnitude of the savings. If 1.3 MAF of water are diverted 
from agriculture's surface water supply, trading can cut revenue impacts by 
more than half. This result follows from the huge diversity in agricultural 
water productivity seen in Figure 1; half of all the water used by California 
growers produces only 15% of all State farm sales. These conclusions, in 
15. See also L. DIXON ET AL., CALIFORNIA’S 1991 DROUGHT WATER BANK (1993).
  
West  Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008 
214 
particular the dramatic savings generated by water trading, should be borne 
in mind by all groups seeking to reconfigure State water policy. 
It is also important to give some context to the revenue loss 
measurements in Table 1. California growers produce close to $20 billion in 
output each year. A $100 million loss from improving Bay/Delta water quality 
amounts to less than one percent of State farm sales. Losses may be high 
among some groups of water users even though aggregate losses are low. 
Junior water rights holders will bear most of these losses. 
The rationing model analysis indicates the importance of trading 
between growers in the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys. Under the 
proportional implementation scheme, growers in southern and western 
regions of the San Joaquin Valley suffer the largest losses from reducing 
water supplies. The efficient scheme allows these growers to buy water from 
those in the Tehama-Colusa area of the Sacramento Valley. The net effect of 
this transfer is to substitute lost grain production north of the Delta for lost 
fruit and vegetable production south of the Delta. If cross-Delta conveyance 
is limited by physical and institutional constraints, losses from improving 
Bay/Delta water quality will be higher. While some serious constraints on 
Delta conveyance may be required to protect Bay/Delta fisheries, configuring 
the impact model to allow unrestrained conveyance measures the total 
potential benefits of north-south trading. 
There are a number of real, difficult conflicts in California water policy, 
a fact to which those currently engaged in debates about the future of the 
Bay/Delta estuary can attest. What nearly all sides are looking for, however, 
is a formula by which California agriculture can coexist with the natural 
environment. This Article demonstrates that by maximizing the value of 
scarce water used to produce food and fiber, water trading can help 
ameliorate the perceived conflict between environmental quality and 
economic activity. 
